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A STORY 
Two young people who worked in service departments of the 
Sydney Adventist Hospital were friendly-a little too friendly! 
Presently the girl was noticeably pregnant, and this intelligence 
was reported to Administration. What was to be done? We did 
nothing-a favored administrative strategy. But pregnancies are 
expansive. The circle of the informed and the concerned also 
grew, and demands to do something became compelling. 
A discipline committee decided the couple should leave, and 
to my everlasting shame I accepted the decision. I did not, of 
course, implement the decision. That was delegated to an of-
ficer of the personnel department. Delegation is another ad-
ministrative strategy - not particularly suited to moral enterprise. 
I did not know then that neither young person had anywhere 
to go. They both came from broken homes. At one home they 
were declared unwelcome, and the other no longer existed. 
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The couple decided that together they wanted to make a go 
of things because they loved each other. They consulted a church 
pastor for help and requested marriage. He referred the matter 
to the church board. The board decided they could be married 
subject to formal censure, a measure which was designed to place 
the church's position on premarital relations on record. The plan 
was dropped because the young man did not want his partner 
to receive or accept blame. 
At this stage (I remain amazed) the couple returned to the 
hospital. We have a beautiful little chapel, and they asked to be 
married there. We granted their request, but imposed certain 
restrictions. There was to be no confetti, no petals; the ceremony 
had to be completed by a certain time. There were not to be 
too many friends and guests. "We have no friends;' they said. 
In the end our chaplains mustered a few staff members to witness 
the ceremony. Can you have a wedding without guests? I sup-
pose it defeats the main purpose, that of public declaration of 
commitment. 
For some time I received reports of the couple's progress. 
There were three in the family now. They were struggling to 
make ends meet, but otherwise they were doing well. Their love 
endured. 
It is a story that ended well. Was this because of, or in spite 
of, our excursion into moral discipline? Might it not have con-
cluded otherwise-with, say, a discreet abortion or, with so much 
rejection on all sides, even a suicide? 
Reflection on this incident lies behind a change in my think-
ing about the exercise of moral responsibility. It seems to me 
now that self-interest was significant in my motivation: 
• I had removed a source of offence and embarrassment, and 
for those persons in the community whose major claim to piety 
was the keeping of a watchful eye on others, a preoccupation. 
You know how distracting things like this can be in institu-
tional life. 
• I was seen to act decisively. Opportunities for leadership to 
demonstrate capacity of that sort are not to be lightly passed 
over. 
• I was seen to be a defender of standards. Nothing could be 
more impressive in the setting of a religious community than 
for a leader to appear assiduous in that role. 
• My action therefore tended to enhance the image of leader-
ship and to preserve the solidarity of the group-administration 
bonanza! 
My determinati~n was also highly idealistic: 
• It reflected the world as I felt it ought to be. In an ill-defined 
way I may have considered my action as a witness to that world 
and therefore in some sense evangelistic. 
• My action did not, however, account for the reality of the world 
as it is . Virtue was taken for granted. There was no provision 
for default. 
• Most importantly, in the name of a higher cause my action 
failed to address the clamant needs of the case at hand. 
We can then construct two platforms or worlds of presupposi-
tion for ethical enterprise: 
EGO/IDEAL 
The first I shall call the world 
of the ego/ideal. 
By ego I mean simply self. 
By ideal I mean the highest 
aim or good. 
This is the abstract world of 
ideas, values, interests and 
beliefs. 
ALTER/EXISTENT 
The second is the world of the 
alter/existent. 
By alter I mean simply other. 
By existent I mean life as it 
is lived. 
This is the concrete world of 
event, encounter, circumstance 
and contingency. 
This description is, of course, another illustration of the 
Platonic dichotomy which has for so long plagued and corrupted 
human thought: the division between idea, form and substance, 
body and soul, mind, spirit and matter and so on. It runs through 
philosophy and theology. So we have phenomena and noumena; 
transcendent and immanent; realized eschatology, future 
eschatology; kingdoms on the left, kingdoms on the right. (We 
sometimes forget that the kingdom on the left, i.e., the 
civil/secular, is God's also.) There are divisions of other kinds: 
Bertrans Russell observed that human history has been deter-
mined by two great opposing forces; prudence and passion. 
There are the distinctions between profession and practice, in-
tention and action, and so on. 
There is no need to enlarge on this vast dichotomy; it is in-
evitable and perhaps necessary in a broken world. St. Paul, with 
his predilection for the broad canvas and flair for the master 
stroke, foreshadowed that at the right time God would bring all 
things together(1) . 
The point we must make is that the whole of moral enter-
prise is necessarily grounded in another world falling between 
and incorporating the two-the world of ambiguity: 
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Dilemma 
Ego/Ideal Ambiguity Alter/Existent 
Tension 
We use ambiguity in the sense not only of two-sidedness bu 
of the unclear, the problematic and the controversial. We are 
speaking of a world of many shades of grey. It is the world of 
dilemma and tension in which decision-making must take place. 
For us, there can be no high moral ground, a platform on which 
we decision-makers may stand either pretentiously or com-
placently. It is not that there is no right or wrong, no good or 
bad, no criterion or standard. The problem is not in anything 
around us. As we suggested in the beginning, the weakness lies 
in ourselves. 
In his book The Puzzles of Childhood (2) the celebrated 
Australian historian Manning Clark paints a picture of his father, 
a minister of religion, a man of impressive piety who professed 
much. The son observed, however, that while the father fervently 
preached forgiveness (a favorite topic) he could not forget. The 
picture painted by the son is, in the words of one critic, that 
of a man who was "all morality and no charity:' Sadly this is a 
common contradiction. 
My contention is that recognition of the ambiguity which per-
vades the human condition provides a key to strategy for moral 
decision-making. 
In any strategy that attempts to address problems in an am-
biguous world there must be openness. We can and do have com-
mitments. These must be combined with openness-openness 
to the recognition of our biases. 
Philip Wogaman, in his book A Christian Method of Moral Judg-
ment, has pointed out that not only are our presuppositions (those 
important points of departure) subject to bias, but every step 
in the decision-making process: 
the questions we ask 
the methods we follow 
the priorities we establish 
the solutions we propose. 
Complete detachment and objectivity are impossible (and 
perhaps undesirable). The stronger our conviction the less likely 
we are to be a fair judge of our impartiality. 
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( The HIV' Status of Health Professionals: 
Do Patients Have a Right to Kno",? 
Risk Transmissiorl of HIV 
from Infected Clinician 
to Susceptible Patients 
By 
Harvey A. Elder, M.D. 
Epidemiology 
Jerry Pettis Veterans Administration Hospital 
Loma Linda, California 
r. THE STORY 
An oral surgeon with AIDS extracted two molars under local 
anesthesia in the fall of 1987 from a lady with no identified risk 
(NIR) for AIDS. Four weeks later she had symptoms consis-
tent with, but not classic for, primary HIV syndrome. By sum-
mer 1989 she had severe thrush, and AIDS developed by 
December 1989. None recorded that she was exposed to the 
surgeon's blood.(1) The surgeon conscientiously wore masks and 
gloves for all patient contact. Judging from X-rays, the extrac-
tions should not have been complex. The surgeon acknowl-
edged occasional needle stick injuries with local anesthetic 
needles, but denied any since 1987. 
II. BACKGROUND 
HIV infection is difficult to acquire. There must be exposure 
to HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. One million people infected 
with HIV have become infected by exposure to the virus, but 
not by the mere presence of infected people. For infection to 
occur, the virus must enter tissue. Either HIV enters the blood 
directly, i.e., IV drug users sharing needles, contaminated 
needles, infected blood, and vertical transmission from an in-
fected expectant mother to her fetus; or HIV enters indirectly 
during sexual intercourse (heterosexual or homosexual) with an 
infected partner. A person is most capable of transmitting HIV 
early, while unaware of the incubating HIV infection and late, 
during symptoms and physical impairment of AIDS. 
Three factors tie this case of AIDS to the surgeon. 1. He had 
a high titer of HIV at the time of surgery. 2. The patient had 
no other identified risk factors (NIR). 3. Genetic sequences from 
HIV of both individuals were closely related.(2) The arguments 
against transmission from surgeon to patient are weak: emergence 
of AIDS in only two years (a rare event) suggests that exposure 
occurred before 1987, before she was seen by the surgeon. Three 
years after surgery, investigators found no evidence documen-
ting her exposure to his blood. 
HIV has considerable genetic variability in certain parts of the 
envelope gene. Epidemiological procedures developed to trace 
HIV from donor to recipient have not yet been perfected. The 
HIV envelope genes of this patient and dentist were quite similar; 
thus the two HIV strains are of identical or nearly identical origin. 
The argument for transmission from dentist to patient rests upon 
these data. 
Centers for Disease Control released data, however in-
complete, not because the data proved transmission but because 
it may be significant. This preliminary report allowed people to 
choose their response. The report informs but does not state 
a CDC position. It is not a mandate "to do something:' 
III. GENETIC SEQUENCE STUDIES: 
1. Viral isolates from different individuals, or the same in-
dividual at different times, have markedly different genetic se-
quences.(3) However, recent reports(4 ,S) suggest that even dif-
ferent HIV strains may have similar genetic sequences. To date 
only a few investigators have studied HIV genetic sequences(6) 
and the database(7) is limited. Only four epidemiologic studies 
of HIV genetic sequence exist. (8) 
I tentatively accept the genetic epidemiologic data that the 
HIV from patient and surgeon are from a single source. Prior 
to confirmation and documentation of the epidemiologic value 
of HIV genetic sequencing I recognize that the theory may be 
wrong: HIV genetic sequences may not be as diverse and may 
not be suitable for epidemiologic study. Also, these procedures 
in early stages of development are not standardized and may have 
technical problems, i.e., the reagents may be contaminated or 
the sequential analysis may be flawed.(9) 
IV. WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM STUDIES OF 
HEPATITIS B TRANSMISSION FROM HBV IN-
FECTED HCW AND PATIENTS: 
This report is the first suggestion of HIV transmission from 
HCW (health-care worker) to patient. In contrast to HIV, HBV 
(Hepatitis B, a blood-borne virus) is easily transferred from 
surgeon (or other HCW) to patient under the following 
circumstances(1 0): 
1. The HCW has a high titer of HBV (HBeAg+). Surgeons 
with low titer (HBeAg-) do not occupationally transfer HIV.(11) 
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2. A means exists for HBV to leave the health-care worker, 
transfer to and enter the patient. 
HIV transfer from surgeon (or any HCW) to patient is far less 
efficient than HBV and probably less frequent. Transfer of HBV 
from infected surgeon to patient is nearly zero (one case reported) 
if precautions are used.(12) Best guess estimates that one to two 
percent of HCW with frequent patient blood contact, are HBV 
infected and able to transmit infection to patients. In the ten 
years from 1979 to 1989, 200 cases of hepatitis B are so transmit-
ted. These data suggest that occupational transmission of HIV 
(which is less efficiently transmitted) from surgeons (or other 
HCW) to patients will be infrequent and that the risk is low. 
y. WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT HIV TRANSFER 
FROM HeW TO PATIENTS: 
Some surgical procedures are performed by feel manipulation 
of needles and other scalpels, not under direct visualization. Dur-
ing these operations, surgeons direct their needle or scalpel by 
"feel:' Because surgeons performing these procedures frequent-
ly stick or nick their fingers, or otherwise draw their blood, these 
are "high risk procedures:'(13) Some procedures (non-invasive) 
are closed, the skin is never broken. 
To date, 4,500 patients operated on by HIV infected surgeons 
have been reviewed with no evidence of surgeon transfer to pa-
tient.(14,15,16,17) Rhame estimates that HIV transmission from 
surgeon to patient occurs with a frequency between one per 
100,000 and one per 1,000,000 operations.(18) 
Likelihood of occupationally acquired HIV infection after nee-
dle stick or other such exposure is less than 1I100th that of 
HBY.(19,20) 1. The HIV-infected HCW are much less likely to 
transmit their virus to their patients than HBV-infected HCW 
(probably by a 100-fold factor). 2. Fewer HCW have HIV infec-
tion (about 5,000) than HBV (about 50,000). 3. Transmission 
of HBV from HCV to patient is 100 times more likely than HIY. 
Hepatitis B kills one percent acutely and an additional five per-
cent during the next ten years, i.e., a total of 6 percent will die 
from Hepatitis B during the first ten years after infection. The 
larger number of HBV-infected HCW and the higher transmis-
sion rate show why 100 to 300 times more patients acquire HBV 
as HIV from HCW. Assuming that HIV infection is 100 per-
cent fatal, and that HBV 6 percent, then for every HCW-
transmitted HIV (and death), 6 to 12 patients die of HCW-
transmitted HBY. The risk of AIDS acquired from a HCW is 
less than the risk of death from HBV acquired from a HCW. 
Likelihood of patient-acquired HIV infection from infected 
health-care workers is probably less than that of occupationally 
acquired HIV infection by health-care workers. This conclusion 
is based on the following: 1. the number of HIV-infected pa-
tients is high (over 1,000,000), while the number of HIV-infected 
health-care workers is low (about 5,000). 2. HIV-infected pa-
tients seek health care when their virus titer is high and they 
are most infectious. Health-care workers stop working because 
they are symptomatic as their HIV titer rises and they become 
more infectious. Though more than 25 HCW have occupational-
ly acquired AIDS, this is the first possible case of occupational 
HIV transmission from HCW to patient. The risk appears to 
be low. This is an infrequent event occurring about once in over 
150,000 cases of AIDS. 
Y. SUMMARY: 
A patient, without identified risks for HIV, has AIDS. Her 
HIV has many genetic sequences in common with those of her 
dentist who extracted two molars about two years prior to her 
AIDS. The genetic sequence data are suggestive, but not now 
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conclusive. The patient could have acquired HIV from the nee-
dle used for local anesthesia prior to oral surgery. 
Data from HBV studies suggest that very few HCW ever 
transfer HBV to a patient. HCW with very high virus concen 
trations do not transfer HBV when they follow universal precau-
tions [with only one exception(21»). Present data strongly sug-
gest that HIV will spread far less easily from HCW to patients 
than HBY. If this is a case of occupational HIV transfer from 
HCW to patient, it is the first in over 150,000 cases of AIDS. 
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Does the Patient Have a Right 
to Know the HIV Status 
of the Health-Care Worker? 
By 
Robert D. OfT, M. D. 
Family Medicine, LLUMC 
Ethics Consultant, LLUMC 
Loma Linda University 
We will try to answer this question by looking first at public 
opinion, then at the stance of the medical profession, and 
finally, at the ethical issues involved. 
In a 1987 Gallup poll of 1,000 adults, 86 percent believed that 
the patient should be told if a physician has AIDS. Eighty per-
cent felt that all health-care workers should be screened for HIV 
antibodies, and 57 percent believed that HIV positive health-
care workers should be denied the right to practice. 
In a 1988 poll of 2,000 adults, Gerbert found that 80 percent 
believed that physicians should inform their patients of their HIV 
status, and 56 percent would switch physicians if theirs was HIV-
positive. In addition, 32 percent believe that physicians should 
inform their patients if they are providing care for HIV patients 
in their practice, and 25 percent would switch if they learned 
this information. 
It seems clear from these two polls of public opinion that the 
public believes patients have a right to know the HIV status of 
health-care workers. 
In 1988 the AMA stated: ''A physician who knows that he or 
she is seropositive should not engage in any activity that creates 
a risk of transmission of the disease to others:' This was before 
the tragic case of Kimberly Bergalis became public knowledge. 
In light of that case, and since the AMA did not define "any 
activity" or "a risk;' this would appear to be a concrete state-
ment by the medical profession prohibiting HIV-positive physi-
cians from practicing. 
In considering the ethical issues involved in this question, we 
will discuss issues of consent, rights and risks. 
Valid consent is the clinical concept that a competent patient 
must be given adequate information before he or she agrees to 
a particular intervention, and must not be subject to coercion 
in the decision. While most physicians, ethicists and attorneys 
agree on this concept, there is not clear agreement on what con-
stitutes "adequate information:' 
The legal doctrine of informed consent has been around for 
about seventy years. Until 1972, all courts ruled that the stan-
dard for determining what was adequate information was the 
"reasonable physician" standard. That is, a physician must tell 
his or her patient what any reasonable physician would disclose. 
In J 972 an appellate court introduced a new standard which has 
been adopted by several jurisdictions, including California. The 
new standard is the "reasonable patient" standard; i.e., a physi-
cian must tell his or her patients what any reasonable patient 
vould want to know. This shifts the focus from the physician's 
duty to the patient's rights. 
The public says it has the right to know the health-care 
worker's HIV status. If we accept this as public policy, does this 
mean that the public also has the right to know the health-care 
worker's transfusion history (how many units; what year; were 
the donors screened for HIV antibody?), or history of intravenous 
drug abuse (when , where, shared needles), or their sexual prac-
tices? May the patient say to the surgeon: "Since you will be 
removing my gallbladder tomorrow, I would like to know how 
many times in the past six months you have had anal receptive 
intercourse" ? 
Health-care workers are people too. They also have rights. 
They have the right to privacy. Courts have said that people who 
are HIV positive (presumably including health-care workers) have 
the right to non-discrimination in work, insurance and housing. 
It should be pointed out that an asymptomatic HIV-positive 
status does not qualify a health-care worker to receive disability 
insurance benefits. Being ill with AIDS, on the other hand, may 
result in benefits. 
The third issue that enters into our ethical analysis is the matter 
of risk. The adequate information that must be discussed before 
valid consent may be obtained includes a discussion of risk. For 
any proposed intervention, there are at least three elements to 
the risk: (a) the risk inherent in the intervention itself, (b) the 
degree that this procedural risk is modified by the condition of 
the patient, and (c) the degree that the procedural risk is modified 
by the operator. For example, a given operation may have a risk 
of death of 1 percent, but if the patient is in poor condition, 
the risk for him may be 5 percent or even higher. Likewise, if 
the surgeon has never performed this operation before, or is 
himself at risk of having a heart attack or a seizure during per-
formance of the surgery, the patient's risk may be higher than 
the 1 percent procedural risk. Procedural risks and patient risks 
are usually recognized and discussed with patients during the 
consent process. Operator risks are less often recognized , and 
are even less often discussed. 
Operator risks include inexperience, impairment and illness. 
Impairment (e.g., by substance abuse, emotional disorder, ef-
fects of aging) are different in that there is usually an element 
of denial on the part of the impaired health-care worker. The 
impairment is usually recognized by someone else first, and the 
impaired person must be confronted. Illness, on the other hand, 
is usually recognized by the health-care worker first. Illness that 
may increase patient risk includes such things as hepatitis B, 
tuberculosis, methicillin-resistant staphylococcal colonization, 
unstable coronary artery disease, uncontrolled seizures, tremor, 
and HIV-positivity. Operator risk may even be influenced by lack 
of sleep or distraction by family or other stresses. 
When does a risk become significant? Traditionally in medicine 
we try to assess both the severity and probability in determin-
ing significance. For example, if a drug used during a procedure 
has a 1 in 50 chance of causing a transient rash that doesn't even 
itch, that would likely not be considered a significant risk that 
needs to be discussed with the patient beforehand. On the other 
hand, if the procedure has a 1 in 500 chance of causing the pa-
tient's death, it would be very significant, even though less likely. 
Is the risk of transmission of the HIV virus from a health-care 
worker to a patient significant? Certainly the severity is very high, 
approaching 100 percent mortality. Most likely everyone who 
contracts the virus will eventually develop AIDS, and , with the 
current state of the art, everyone with AIDS will die. The proba-
bility, on the other hand, approaches zero, but as Kimberly 
Bergalis has taught us, is not equal to zero. Estimates of the 
probability of transfer of the virus from surgeon to patient range 
continued on page 7 
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Clifford - continued from page 2 
For those of us who have religious commitments, it is impor-
tant to recognize that understanding of what it means to be true 
to Scripture has also undergone considerable development. We 
remain persuaded that Scripture does speak to our time, but how? 
How do we move from the historic witness to discover God's 
will for the present, or from the present to find His will in the 
historic witness? 
Of the numerous models which have been elaborated for the 
use of Scripture in ethics, two seem especially helpful: 
The formation of character model (B. C. Birch and L. L. 
Rasmussen). The concept here is that our faith through its 
stories, images and symbols conditions our perceptions and com-
mends certain values. Internalization of these values and the im-
ages and symbols that go with them shapes our attitudes and 
intentions and in turn our pattern of response. Ultimately these 
dominant values determine our priorities and inform our 
decisions: 
FAITH 
(stories, images, symbols) 
perceptions, values 
attitudes, intentions, character 
disposition 
decision 
ACTION 
There is, according to this thesis, an inextricable relationship 
between the ethics of being and the ethics of doing. There is 
consistency between the good person and the right action. 
The moral principle model (A. von Harnack) proposes that the 
most fitting application of Scripture in ethics is at the level of 
moral principle. Certain general principles may be discerned in 
our foundation sources which can be applied to a variety of con-
crete situations: 
PRINCIPLES 
guidance 
rules, codes, imperatives 
decision 
ACTION 
This is not to say that Scripture may not provide more specific 
direction. At the lower levels in this functional hierarchy, however, 
cultural factors and circumstances of time and place become in-
creasingly influential. This is where problems of interpretation 
can be very difficult. 
The strength of these approaches is that they do justice to 
persons as intelligent and free moral agents. To speak of ethics 
and morals without agency or freedom is a contradiction. These 
models are also responsive to the need for Christian ethics to 
address ever-changing situations. They do not, however, remove 
from us the inconvenience of having to work out how to be Chris-
tian in the late twentieth century, and they do call on us to ex-
pose our accepted patterns of response to examination and to 
change them if necessary. (see box on page 7) 
Of course, not all will agree with our choice of model or prin-
ciple or that we have applied them appropriately. This should 
not disturb us. Scripture is rich in its diversity. Certainly dif-
ferences should not divide us. It is more important to preserve 
our agency and to cherish our freedom . We must remain open. 
An interim ethic may be necessary, if finality cannot be achieved. 
It is difficult for a medical practitioner to admit on occasion that 
little can be done-so much is expected. We have sometimes 
6 
nurtured unrealistic expectations, thereby undermining accep-
tance of greater individual responsibility for health. This is one 
of the criticisms of modern medical practice. 
It is likewise difficult for a Christian who fervently believe 
in the all-sufficiency of his faith to accept that one may not have 
answers to some questions, or that one's recommendations may 
not be accorded the priority they seem to deserve. In matters 
of faith, too, unrealistic expectations may undermine acceptance 
of responsibility. 
I was impressed with this when exploring the possibilities for 
response to the AIDS problem with a group of church and com-
munity representatives in New South Wales. 
To the church group the solution seemed so obvious: im-
mediate return to the principle of fidelity. Exclusive permanent 
heterosexual union was the complete answer, and this was the 
propitious time for it. The group was incredulous when others, 
one of whom was a leading judicial figure, seemed unim-
pressed. Confidence in the prospect of a universal mass reform 
movement of this kind is unrealistic-to the point of naivete. And 
we can be naive. 
The question is therefore, what do we do now? The ideal can-
not be realized, the infection continues to spread, and the 
numbers of sufferers continues to grow everywhere. Can we sup-
port simple interim measures to control transmission-safer sex-
ual practices and syringe exchange programs? Can we still ac-
cept responsibility? 
To proclaim an absolute ideal and proffer nothing 
else to those unable to attain the absolute is a denial 
of charity, an abdication of ethical responsibility and 
an exercise in Pharisaic elitism. .. In a broken 
world, second best is better than none. .. J. 
McPherson, Ed. Aids and Compassion, Canberra, St. 
Marks. 1988(4). 
The respected John Howard Yoder, in his book The Politics of 
Jesus(S) , makes the radical suggestion that participation in the 
suffering of Christ (i.e., the taking up of one's cross) does not 
mean simply the denial of a selfish way of life. It means quite 
specifically the abandonment of legitimate ends if they cannot 
be achieved by legitimate means. I make a further proposal 
(which Yoder declined to make) that following in the way of Christ 
may sometimes mean the giving up of the most legitimate means 
in favor of a worthy end. This is particularly important in the 
context of human welfare and the saving of life. I am inclined 
in such circumstances to support Fletcher, who argues, if from 
a different standpoint, that "Any disvalue in the means must be 
outweighed by value gained in the end"(6). 
In an ambiguous world, an interim ethic may be necessary 
if we cannot achieve finality. We must continue to care when 
we cannot be correct (by being correct I mean conforming to 
a code or standard-personal, professional or religious). 
To continue to care when we cannot be correct is an immense 
challenge. Our natural reaction under those circumstances is to 
withdraw, to dissociate ourselves from compromise. 
A patient in our hospital had developed an acute postoperative 
complication. His own surgeon could not be contacted. I re-
quested another visiting surgeon in the hospital at the time to 
see the patient. To my surprise he declined, declaring that on 
ethical grounds he could not see another doctor's patient withou' 
a direct request from him. (It is true that referral by formal notict-. 
is entrenched in Australian medical protocol.) The doctor was 
correct, very correct, but did he really care? 
Application of Principles to Some Contemporary Ethical Problems 
PROBLEM 
Life support 
GUILDING PRINCIPLES RESOLUTION 
reverence for life (creation) optimum rather than maximum 
acceptance of temporarily (fall) support 
Organ transfer privileged place of the body in giving and receiving 
acts of love taking and getting 
(incarnation, eucharist, passion) selling and buying 
Animal welfare/ 
experimentation 
cultural mandate (domination, 
stewardship) 
respect and responsibility for all 
(sentient) life 
Status of women equality, complementarity (creation, justification) all forms of discrimination are 
cultural only 
In the earlier years of the AIDS epidemic there was a reluc-
tance among many health-care professionals and agencies to ac-
cept and to admit seropositive patients. Fear was a factor, but 
there was also disagreement with health authority policy on con-
fidentiality and testing, and there was distaste for the perceivedly 
less-than-correct circumstances under which many patients con-
tracted the infection. There is also a wider movement, admit-
tedly a strongly opposed one, to restrict therapeutic options in 
the ca~e of self-inflicted illness, illness resulting from, for exam-
ple, self-indulgent lifestyles. The employment of a culpability 
index has been suggested for this purpose. Where would one 
stop? 
If we have come to terms with the ambiguity in the world (an 
ambiguity in which we ourselves participate) we will continue 
to care whatever the circumstances. This is what I think of as 
world responsibility. It is the reverse side of the coin of world 
evangelism. 
The concept "world responsibility" implies an 
awareness that the world is in sin and will remain 
in sin for the time being. It implies that the com-
munity of believers is unable to abandon it in spite 
of that unalterable fact. It implies that the communi-
ty is called upon to participate in God's determina-
tion to assume responsibility; for the world, to suf-
fer its present state, ... to keep the doors open for 
a total renewal at all times. (Nurnberger. Theological 
Ethics, UNISA. 1980.) (7). 
I further suggest that responsibility must take precedence over 
evangelism. 
I have referred to a change in my thinking. What would this 
change mean in terms of our original story-if I had a second 
chance? 
I think I would call the couple involved, perhaps even call on 
them. I would tell them that I had learned a little of what had 
happened and that I was anxious to help in any way. When I 
discovered that they wished to keep the baby I would tell them 
how pleased I was about that. I would ask more about their plans. 
When I learned that they wished to marry I would discreetly 
try to prepare the ground for them. I would consult the minister 
of the church of their choice and ask him, in the name of the 
Sydney Adventist Hopsital, to be helpful. I would explain what 
I knew of the background to the situation and what the hospital 
was prepared to do. I would indicate to the couple that they would 
be welcome to continue work at the institution. We would offer 
' 1b security for the mother, who would need some leave of 
absence. When I learned that they had few friends, I would assure 
them that we, the administration and staff, were all their friends. 
I would ask about their accommodation and needs and assure 
them that any reasonable help that could be afforded would be 
given. I would ask them to report to me again. ' 
All of this would cost the hospital very little. It would, however, 
go beyond a commitment to world evangelism to' acceptance of 
world responsibility, to a keeping of the doors open until the 
time when, in Paul's words, "God will bring all things together"(1). 
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Orr - continued from page 5 
from 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 1,000,000. And that number is greatly 
influenced by the stage of the disease in the health-care worker, 
and by the invasiveness of the intervention. 
Prior to this first case of probable transmission from health 
care worker to patient, the CDC had said that HIV-positive 
health-care workers should refrain from patient contact if they 
had exudative skin lesions, and should use barrier protection of 
the patient if they were engaged in invasive procedures. They 
defined invasive procedures as surgical entry into tissues, cavities 
or organs; care of major traumatic injuries, cardiac catheteriza-
tion or angiographic procedures; vaginal or caesarean delivery; 
manipulation, cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral lesions; 
or other procedures in which bleeding may occur. 
The Bergalis case suggests that currently recommended bar-
riers are not sufficient protection. The CDC is reassessing its 
position on barriers and/or prohibition of HIV-positive health-
care workers from certain clinical situations. 
This significance of risk that we have been discussing is the 
medical profession's assessment of risk. The courts have said 
that the reasonable patient's assessment is what counts. Courts 
define "material risk" as a risk that would make a difference to 
the patient. The polls cited earlier indicate that a majority of 
the public considers the HIV status of the health-care worker 
to be "material" information in that they would switch to another 
health caretaker if they knew their doctor was HIV-positive. 
What might be the consequences of a public policy that states 
a patient has a "right to know" the health-care worker's HIV 
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status? As would be predicted from the poll results, and as has 
been experienced by a few physicians whose HIV status became 
public knowledge, their practices would disappear overnight. 
Most patients would no longer seek medical care from someone 
they perceived as a danger to them. 
A second consequence would be a very rapid move to demand 
mandatory testing of all health-care workers. If the patient has 
a right to know, the profession will be forced to make known. 
Since the test for HIV antibodies is not 100 percent reliable, 
this would generate both false positives and false negatives. A 
person without life-style risk factors for HIV-positivity has a 
greater chance of having a false positive HIV test than a true 
positive. False positives have caused divorces and have resulted 
in suicides. People who test negative although infected, on the 
other hand, will have a false sense of security and may, in fact, 
expose others unknowingly because they might be less inclined 
to use barrier precautions than if unaware of their HIV status. 
A third consequence of such a right to know would be a fur-
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A couple of years ago Dr. Jack Provonsha speaking on Ethics 
and Law, stood for the proposition that good ethics done in a 
timely fashion creates good laws. I will tell you that courts, in 
my never humble opinion, do not make laws that result in the 
practice of good medicine that result in good ethics. What they 
are doing is responding to a lack of ethical decisions as they 
perceive them in the medical world. 
On this issue of informed consent and the HIV-positive physi-
cian, I can tell you where California law will make its decision. 
I'll also report that California leads the nation medically in studies 
of this condition and legally in deciding what to do about it. 
The leading informed-consent case in California is Cobbs vs. 
Grant. The California Supreme Court was the first in the nation 
to reject the reasonable physician standard and adapt the 
reasonable patient standard. What would a patient want to know 
before undergoing a given procedure? A majority of health-care 
providers say that they would want to know of an HIV-positive 
finding in a health-care professional. If a health-care professonal 
would want that, what do you suppose the general public would 
want? 
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ther drift of the patient-physician relationship toward an adver-
sarial one. 
As a patient advocate, I concur with the legal doctrine that 
states a physician has a duty to warn patients of significant risks( 
As an advocate of the traditional patient-physician relationship, 
I believe the profession should determine when a risk becomes 
significiant. 
In conclusion, the patient has a right to protection from signifi-
cant risk of transmission of the HIV virus. The known HIV-
positive health-care worker has a duty either to inform a patient 
of this when he or she will perform an invasive procedure, or 
to refrain from doing invasive procedures. A health-care worker 
who performs invasive procedures does not have a duty to be 
HIV tested unless he or she is at risk. 
Good ethics begins with good facts. As the facts of HIV disease 
change, the ethical analysis of these questions should be 
re-evaluated. • 
The court, in discussing this reasonable patient standard, af-
firmed the duty to disclose to the patient known risks of death 
or serious bodily harm. With basic assumptions that 1) the physi-
cian knows that he or she is HIV-positive, and 2) transmission 
from the health-care provider to the patient is possible, I predict 
that a California court will decide that risk of death from HIV 
communication from the physician is significant, and the patient 
must be informed. Once that patient is informed, if he or she 
still chooses to undergo treatment by that physician or health-
care provider, that would be effective informed consent. 
The opposite argument, the one made in favor of the Florida 
dentist in the Kimberly Bergalis story, was that if the dentist hal 
told his patients he was HIV-positive, he would be out ot 
business, he would lose his practice. As your lawyer I would never 
make that argument because it is one of avarice. How am I go-
ing to eat? How am I going to pay my bills once I'm out of prac-
tice because of an HIV- positive finding? That argument isn't 
going far with a jury and a judge who will apply the reasonable 
patient standard. You are not going to get a jury of physicians; 
you're going to get twelve folks, good and true, from the local 
community, and they're going to be asked to decide what the 
reasonable person would have wanted to know under those 
circumstances. 
In conclusion, it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physi-
cian, to decide whether he or she wants to undergo a given pro-
cedure. In making that decision, under California law, the pa-
tient has a right to know all relevant perils known to the physi-
cian. Do you have to give a four-year course in medicine? Of 
course not. But a jury is going to be asked how much the physi-
cian should have told the patient, and I think Dr. Elder is ab-
solutely correct when he says that with a known risk of transmis-
sion the health-care provider in California will be negligent if 
he or she does not provide that information to the patient in 
advance of an invasive procedure .• 
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